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There seems to be a great deal of uncertainty as to the exact
extent of the obligations which a person assumes towards a corpora-
tion and its stockholders when he becomes a director. The theory
is simple to the extreme. A corporation can act only through human
agencies; the stockholders, who control its policies, are in general
too numerous and too scattered to wield this ultimate power directly
and so choose periodically a select body, usually from their own
numbers, designed to supervise its operations. Each member of
this board is supposed to be familiar with the company's affairs, to
be personally interested in its advancement and to give matters
brought to his attention as careful thought as possible.
Now one of the problems of corporate management is, how to
make the average director do the work which in theory belongs to
him, and which the stockholders expect him to perform. It is a
very familiar fact that men are not only willing but eager to have
their names added to boards of trustees or conspicuous committees
and are then equally willing to pause complacently and allow some-
one else to discharge any onerous duties that may be attached to the
position. No man's best efforts can be aroused, it seems, unless
there is a direct appeal to self-interest, and this, of course, is lack-
ing in the office of a corporation manager.
What might be called the amateur aspect of a directorship has
probably increased greatly during recent years. By this is meant
the idea that such a position is an avocation, a luxury, a compliment
paid to a successful' business or professional man, something like
the bestowal of an honorary degree. And amid the great variety of
other considerations that prevail many have little or nothing to do
with the management of the company's affairs. For example, one
is elected because a relative is a large stockholder and would be
pleased. Another bears an honored or conspicuous name which
would look well upon statements. A third has large interests and
is rather expected to "bring business." It is tacitly understood
that none of these men will be called upon to contribute much of
his time, and whatever their value to a corporation as "drawing
cards" they represent a very large and perhaps increasing element
who take little more interest in its daily transactions than so many
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strangers. When it is considered that as long ago as i89o Mr. Jus-
tice Field declared that four-fifths of the wealth of the Country was
under corporate control and that the proportion has greatly in-
creased since that time, it would seem that every effort should be
made to emphasize the resp.-isibility which properly belongs to
directors.
It must be observed in the first place that there has been no
relaxation as far as the statute books are concerned in the theory
that directors are to exercise an active if not continuous control
over the policy of a company. For example the following is an
extract from the New York Penal Code:'
"A director of a corporation or joint stock association is deemed
to have such a knowledge of the affairs of the corporation or asso-
ciation as to enable him to determine whether any act, proceeding
or omission of its directors is a violation of this chapter. If present
at a meeting of the directors at which any act, proceeding or omis-
sion of such directors in violation of this chapter occurs, he must be
deemed to have concurred therein unless he at the time causes, or in
writing requires, his aissent therefrom to be entered on the min-
utes of the directors. If absent from such meeting, he must be
deemed to have concurred in any such violation if the facts consti-
tuting such violation appear on the record or minutes of- the pro-
ceedings of the board of directors and he remains a director of the
corporation for six months thereafter without causing, or in writing
requiring, his dissent from such violation to be entered on such
record or minutes."
This displays a lively sense of responsibility and points out the
simple and logical way in which a director may avoid penalties in
every case in which a majority of his colleagues undertake a course
of action as a board which would subject them to a civil as well as
a criminal liability. Primarily each director should attend all meet-
ings. If unable for any reason to do so, an absentee should be
required to go over the record and in writing either approve or
repudiate any action that had been taken.
Many of the theoretical safeguards, however, have become either
dead letters or the merest farce. For example, the provision that
directors must be stockholders has become so atrophied that the
phrase "qualifying shares" is employed frankly as though it were
wholly legitimate and did not signify in its very origin a defiance of
the spirit of the provision. For qualifying shares as is well known
are merely those which are entered on the books of the company in
the names of the several directors who have no stock but are desired
as members of the board. So, although the title remains in the
I. § 614.
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company itself they become stockholders as far as the records are
concerned and everyone is satisfied.
Two very obvious lines exist along which reforms might pro-
ceed. One is to recognize the maxim that everybody's business is
nobody's business, and that as long as boards consist of numerous
members with - aguely defined responsibilities very few will feel any
serious sense of personal liability and will be inclined to attend to
their duties only so far as it is convenient for them to do so. This
proposition is emphasized by the modern rise of executive commit-
tees in importance-representing a logical if unconscious trend
towards a concentration of responsibility-or perhaps more prop-
erly a realization of the difficulty of assembling a numerous body
of busy men in a practically volunteer capacity at intervals of such
frequency as to render their meetings very serviceable.
The executive committee is merely an inner circle of the board
composed usually of those directors who are most accessible, most
interested in the operations of the corporation and most familiar
with them. It bears the same relation to the full board that an ordi-
nary agent does to his principal and in general its acts are those of
the board. In many companies indeed its existence has reduced the
directors practically to the level of a ratifying body whose services
might easily be discarded. The full board of directors of many a
company meet only at rare intervals to glance casually over the
transactions of an executive committee of three or five members and
approve them in a perfunctory manner. Perhaps then one method
of checking some of the present shortcomings would be to estab-
lish a low maximuft to the number of directors that even a large
corporation might have. Thus the feeling of personal responsibility
might be intensified by destroying the easy and very human reflec-
tion that others who have more time seem to be doing everything
that is necessary and there is no occasion for worry or effort.
But the other very simple, if not wholly effectual remedy, would
be to define sharply and apply vigorously the penalties which lie
ready for indolent directors. It is impossible to read the cases in
which this very important branch of the law is discussed without
being impressed by the court's conviction of the amateurish charac-
ter of directorships to which reference has been made. From the
gingerly manner in which the question of liability is discussed one
would suppose that directors were all trustees of charitable institu-
tions, giving freely of their services and engaged in most self-deny-
ing tasks. There seems to be ever present a fear lest honorable and
distinguished men will be frightened and refuse to accept positions
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on boards and the wheels of commerce adversely affected if a pol-
icy of punishment that is really efficacious be adopted. The canons
of directorial responsibility are asserted bravely but almost invari-
ably with a countervailing insistence upon preventing alarm to con-
scientious directors. Thus in a leading English case2 Sir George
Jessel remarked: "One must be very careful in administering the
law of joint stock companies not to press so hard on honest direct-
ors as to make them liable for constructive defaults, the only effect
of which would be to deter all men of any property and perhaps all
men who have any character to lose, from becoming directors of
companies at all. On the one hand, I think the court should do its
utmost to bring fraudulent directors to account and on the other
hand should also do its best to allow honest men to act reasonably
as directors." And in a comparatively early New York case,3 judge
Earl remarked of a defendant: "He was simply a director and as
such attended some of the meetings of the board of directors. As
he was a director must we impute to him for the purpose of charg-
ing him with fraud, a knowledge of all the affairs of the company?
If the law requires this, then the position of a director in any large
corporation, like a railroad, banking, or insurance company, is one
of constant peril. The affairs of such a company are generally, of
necessity, largely intrusted to managing officers. The directors
generally cannot know, and have not the ability or knowledge requi-
site to learn by their own efforts the true condition of the affairs of
the company." Is not this last sentence which the writer has ital-
icized an extraordinary indictment of the entire system? Bouvier
defines directors as "persons appointed or elected according to law,
authorized to manage and direct the affairs of a corporation," yet
here is an eminent court practically declaring that they must not be
expected to know or be presumed capable of comprehending the
matters over which they are to have control! Why should not so
important a position as that of director of a mighty corporation be
one of "constant peril?" Is not that exactly what is desired, in
order that everyone who consents thus to take charge of the essen-
tial interests of other people may feel, to speak popularly, if not
technically, that he is a "trustee," subject to the duty of careful
attention that is required of all fiduciaries?
Of course there is not much difficulty in the case of deliberate
and positive wrong-doing, as, for instance, where the directors of a
company met and voted a gratuity to one of themselves, the others
2. In re Forest of Dean Coal Mining Co., xo Ch. Div. 450.
3. Wakeman v. Dalley, 51 N. Y. 27.
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being his near relatives, and the action was held fraudulent as a
clear violation of trust.4 The menace resides in the spirit of indif-
ference and carelessness which is so widely prevalent and which
exists entirely apart from any wrongful intent.
Now waste, mismanagement and neglect are naturally more
conspicuous in "monied" corporations than in those engage't in
ordinary mercantile pursuits and the majority of.cases to be found
in the reports concern banks and similiar institutions. Perhaps, the
leading case in this country is Briggs v. Spaulding,, in which, by a
vote of five to four, the Supreme Court emphasized the importance
of preserving a directorship from even the appearance of danger
and hence, unpopularity. The facts in the case were disquieting,
but, unfortunately, only too familiar; It was an action by the
receiver of a national bank against the directors to enforce their per-
sonal liability. For fourteen years no committee of the directors
had been appointed, as required by the by-laws (which had been
otherwise disregarded also) and the sole management entrusted to
the President. Upon his death the cashier, a young man of about
thirty, was promoted to the vacancy, given a like freedom and within
a few months absolutely wrecked the institution by loaning to him-
self and personal friends almost all the funds of the bank either
upon unsecured notes or worthless collateral. On the board 6f
directors who had been elected at the time of the advancement, one,
S, an elderly man of great experience in banking, regarded himself
as merely an adviser, remained upon his farm at a distance during
the time of wrong-going and did not go near the bank, relying
wholly upon the new President's statement that everything was
going well. Another, C, had been for a long time, and was, when
elected, crippled with rheumatism and wholly unable to attend to the
bank's affairs. A third, J, had illness in -his family and remained
away during these months. Chief Justice Full&r, in the prevailing
opinion remarks: "It is not contended that the defendants know-
ingly violated or permitted the violation of any of the provisions of
the banking act, or that they were guilty of any dishonesty in admin-
istering the affairs of the bank, but it is charged that they did not
diligently perform duties devolved upon them by the act. It is per-
haps unnecessary to atttempt to define with precision the degree of
care and prudence which directors must exercise in the performance
of their duties. The degree of care required depends upon the sub-
ject to which it is to be applied. They are not insurers of the fidelity
4. Butts v. Wood, 38 Barbour (N. Y.), 18i.
S. 141 U. S., 132.
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of the agents whom they have appointed, who are not their agents,
but the agents of the corporation: and they cannot be held responsi-
ble for losses resulting from the wrongful acts or omissions of other
directors or agents unless the loss is a consequence of their own
neglect of duty, either for failure to supervise the business with
attention or in neglecting to use proper care in the appointment of
agents." The Court observed that by long-established usaget the
President and cashier had been left in exclusive charge of the bank
and continued: "The evidence tends to show that the method pur-
sued must have been and was well known to many of its customers,
including those who were creditors at the time of its failure, as well
as its stockholders. All this was not as it should have been and
ought not to be countenanced, but the facts have an important hear-
ing on the question whether S and J should be held liable because
they did not at once endeavor to change the entire method of doing
business and enter upon an exhaustive investigation of the assets.
Would ordinarily prudent and diligent men have done so under
similar circumstances ?" As to C, the rheumatic, the Court says:
"While it may be said that he should not have accepted the position
of director and should not have allowed himself to be re-elected, yet
upon this question of passive negligence the rule would be an
exceedingly rigorous one which made no allowance for the person
charged under such circumstances. We hold that directors must
exercise ordinary care and prudence in the administration of the
affairs of a bank, and that this includes something more than offici-
ating as figure-heads. They are entitled under the law to commit
the banking business, as defined, to their duly authorized officers,
but this does not absolve them from the duty of reasonable super-
vision, nor ought they to be permitted to be shielded from liability
because of want of knowledge of wrong-doing, if that ignorance is
the result of gross inattention: but in this case we do not think these
defendants fairly liable for not preventing loss by putting the bank
into liquidation within ninety days after they became directors and
it is really to that the case becomes reduced at last."
A vigorous dissenting opinion was read by Mr. Justice Harlan
and it seems to the writer that the reasoning is much more sound
than in that of the majority. An atmosphere of good-humored
tolerance pervades the Chief Justice's opinion which is calculated
to allay any uneasiness felt by indolent directors but does not seem
fitted to inspire confidence in the management of our institutions.
The author of Thompson's "Commentaries on Corporations"
6. § 4111, note.
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disapproves of this case and the similar one of Witters v. Sowles,'
observing that the "decisions are unsound" and reduced to the sim-
plest terms the conclusion from them would be that if there is to be
wrong-doing in a corporation it is more prudent for a director to
neglect his duty than to attend to it, especially if he can devise some
plausible excuse for inaction. Even this is not always necessary
as may be seen in a provision of the New York Stock Corporation
Law8 imposing a joint and several personal liability upon directors
for declaring dividends from other than surplus profits. There are
exceptions in favor of those "who may have caused their dissent
therefrom to be entered at large upon the minutes of such direct-
ors at the time or were not present when the same happened" as
though active opposition and absence unexplained were equally par-
donable! This curious and unqualified exception in behalf of non-
attending directors seems very like a statute which should hold a
railway switchman liable for any accident caused by his failure to'
set the proper signals unless he could prove that he was asleep at his
post at the time and so unconscious of what was happening.
In the case of Warner v. PcnoyerO where the cashier of a small
national bank had wrecked it within eighteen months by worthless
discounts and the receiver brought suit against the directors the
same excessive mildness was displayed. The board had appointed a
discount committee consisting of the President aid two directors of
whom one director attended the bank two or three times a week to
approve paper as requested by the cashier while the other director
did nothing. The Court admitted that the President and directors
did not at any time investigate or cause an investigation to be made
of the bank's resources and liabilities and declared that "the directors
in this case relinquished almost untrammeled control of the bank to
the cashier and their supervision over its affairs was so superficial
as to be hardly more than perfunctory." Nevertheless, the Court
went on to say: "We are not satisfied that actionable negligence is
imputable to them collectively or individually were it not found in
their laxity of supervision over discounts. They were under no
duty to observe the extraordinary vigilance short of which a bank
cannot be protected from the crimes conceived by a dishonest
cashier. We are of opinion that only those directors, including the
President, should be held responsible for the losses who were mem-
bers of the discount and examining committees. If the other
7. 31 Fed. Rep., x.
S. § 23.
9. 91 Fed. Rep., 587.
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directors were cognizant of the neglect of duty by these directors,
the proofs do not show it. As against two of the directors, the case
for the complainant is predicated upon their failure to attend the
semi-annual meetings of the board. It is not a necessary or legiti-
mate inference that this omission was a contributory cause of the
losses. It does not follow, because a director has failed to attend
meetings, that he is legally or morally responsible for the disasters
that may have befallen his bank."
These neglectful defendants were under a sworn duty to exer-
cise an active supervision over the affairs of the bank. Great losses
had been incurred by the "superficial" attention of the directors as
a body and here were two who had not even taken the pains to
attend the stated meetings of the board. Yet the court would
impose the duty on the complainant of proving that they would
have prevented the frauds by attendance! Of course, taking up
the directors one by one, it would be impossible to prove that the
absence of any one was a pfoximate cause of loss. Would it not
be the better rule to hold that in the case of such frauds by an officer,
all of the directors guilty of negligence were, prima facie, personally
liable and the burden be placed on each one to show such facts as
would exculpate him? In that event, a plea of continued absence
would be an aggravation of his offence rather than an excuse.
Moreover, it is astonishing that the court should have recognized a
right to delegate not only the duties but the responsibilities as well
of the entire board to two or three of their numbers so that the
members of committees alone could be held. It is elementary that
one with delegated powers cannot himself delegate his discretion but
acts at his peril in so doing. It was, perhaps proper enough for the
board to rid themselves of unwelcome labor by the appointment of
"discount" and "examining" committees probably in accordance
with the by-laws, but such committees were only agents of the
entire body and there could be little harshness in holding the prin-
cipals.
In still another case, Wheeler v. Aiken County Loan & Savings
Bank et aI,10 which was a bill in equity by a stockholder against a
savings bank and some of its directors, alleging mismanagement,
the facts were that one director lived in another town from that in
which the bank was located and asserted that his duties were per-
formed fully by assisting the bank to secure satisfactory connections
at money centers, by such occasional advice as his experience en-
abled him to give, and by infrequent visits. Another was a plain
10. 75 Fed. Rep., 781.
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farmer who was proud of being on a board with "magnates" and
although he attended meetings, he never raised any question as to
the manner in which the institution was run. The Court, in deny-
ing relief, against the directors, said: "The customs and methods of
the community in which the business is done are, for such com-
munity, a standard of prudence and diligence by which the respon-
sibility of bank officers and directors is to be tested: and if there
is ground to believe that there has been a reasonable conformity to
such methods and customs and absolute good faith and honesty of
purpose, it would be unjust to hold to a personal accountability for
loans which subsequent events proved unwise. Men of extraordi-
nary prudence and financial foresight might have foreseen the end,
but directors of a small bank in a small town cannot be justly held
to personal accountability for failing to select as its managers men
of extraordinary gifts. Such men are rare anywhere, and it cannot
be imputed as a fault to these directors that such services were not
secured for the meager salaries paid to the officials of this corpora-
tion." The Court admitted that there had been bad banking which
would not stand the test of rules applied to technical trustees, but
apparently felt that the duties of the directors of a small country
bank were amply performed by electing an officer or two, asking a
question occasionally out of idle curiosity perhaps and in maintain-
ing a scrupulous honesty of intention.
There are some cases in which a more serious view of positive
obligations of directors seems to have been taken. Thus in Gibbons
v. Anderson" which was a peculiarly flagrant instance of neglect
continued through several years, during which the President squan-
dered practically all of the assets, the Court says: "The volume of
business was so small the most cursory examination by anyone hav-
ing ordinary business intelligence would have disclosed the truth.
Some of them (the cases) 'have gone to a length which, in
my opinion, is very dangerous to public safety. . . . The idea
is not to be tolerated, that they (the directors) serve as merely
gilded ornaments of the institution, to enhance its attractiveness or
that their reputations should be used as a lure to customers. What
the public suppose and have the right to suppose is that those men
have been selected by reason of their high character for integrity,
their sound judgment, and their capacity for conducting the affairs
of the bank safely and securely. The public act on this presump-
tion, and trust their property with the bank in the confidence that
the directors will discharge a substantial duty.
' 1 2
zx. 8o Fed. Rep., 345.
12. See comments on the question in Robinson v. Hall, 63 Fed. Rep., 222.
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The lesson to be gathered from the cases seems to be that,
although courts adjure directors to be good and to give some heed
to the companies they have honored with their "assistance," at the
present time they are not required to be familiar with the opera-
tions of the company (Wakeinan v. Dailey) they need not attend
meetings of the board if inconvenient to do so (Briggs v. Spauld-
ing) they are not responsible for the misconduct of executive offi-
cers appointed by themselves (Wheeler v. Aiken Co. Bank) unless,
indeed, the wrong-doing is so palpable that it is practically forced
upon their attention (Gibb ,ns v. Anderson) and if they persuade
two or three of their number to do all the work, the latter alone will
be held responsible for a neglect of such duties (Warren v. Pen-
noyer). Where else in human affairs may be found so admirable
a combination of distinction without anxiety, of reward without
toil? Would it not be well for the corporations and society at large
if penalties that are admitted to be proper in the abstract were
insisted upon until the prodigious number of pseudo-directors who
are now in evidence were "squeezed out," and a really hard-working
director, as distinguished from an officer, became less of an anomaly
than he seems under present conditions?
FREDERICK DWIGHT.
